University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
1989

Speaking with Forked Tongues: Mercantilism,
Telecommunications Regulation, and International Trade
Glenn Harlan Reynolds

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Mar 17 12:46:33 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Mercantilism, Telecommunications
Regulation, and International Trade, 21 LAW & POL'y INT'l Bus. 119 (1989).
ALWD 7th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Mercantilism, Telecommunications
Regulation, and International Trade, 21 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 119 (1989).
APA 7th ed.
Reynolds, G. (1989). Speaking with forked tongues: mercantilism, telecommunications
regulation, and international trade. Law and Policy in International Business, 21(1),
119-140.
Chicago 17th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, "Speaking with Forked Tongues: Mercantilism,
Telecommunications Regulation, and International Trade," Law and Policy in
International Business 21, no. 1 (1989): 119-140
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, "Speaking with Forked Tongues: Mercantilism,
Telecommunications Regulation, and International Trade" (1989) 21:1 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus 119.
AGLC 4th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 'Speaking with Forked Tongues: Mercantilism,
Telecommunications Regulation, and International Trade' (1989) 21(1) Law and Policy
in International Business 119
MLA 9th ed.
Reynolds, Glenn Harlan. "Speaking with Forked Tongues: Mercantilism,
Telecommunications Regulation, and International Trade." Law and Policy in
International Business, vol. 21, no. 1, 1989, pp. 119-140. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 'Speaking with Forked Tongues: Mercantilism,
Telecommunications Regulation, and International Trade' (1989) 21 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus 119
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

REVIEW ESSAY
Speaking With Forked Tongues:
Mercantilism, Telecommunications
Regulation, and International Trade
When Countries Talk: International Trade in Telecommunications
Services By Jonathan David Aronson and Peter F. Cowhey. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988. Pp. xxii, 292. $29.95.
Reviewed by

GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS*

Over the past decade, two profound revolutions have swept the global
economy, with particular impact on the United States. One is the growing
importance of services, both domestically and as a component of international trade. The other is a tremendous explosion in the technology of
telecommunications and an accompanying move toward deregulation of
many telecommunications enterprises.
These developments are not unrelated. Much of the growth in service
industries and in services trade stems from the explosion in telecommunications capabilities available to organizations and individuals: where once,
for example, a Swedish business executive needing advice on U.S. customs
laws would have had to consult a local expert in Stockholm (if one were
available) or contact a U.S. law firm by mail, she can now have her answer in minutes via telephone, facsimile, or other electronic means. Similarly, much of the explosion in telecommunications technology has resulted from the voracious demands of service industries (especially
banking and the management of large corporations) for greater and more
flexible information flow. And both of these explosions have produced intolerable pressure on preexisting regulatory frameworks, with their often
burdensome and arbitrary distinctions and discriminations, while the removal of many of those regulatory barriers has spurred growth in services
and technology.
All of these phenomena are explored at some length in When Countries
* B.A., 1982, University of Tennessee; J.D., 1985, Yale Law School. Associate Professor of
Law, University of Tennessee. I would like to thank Michael Gadbaw and Albert Halprin for some
valuable comments.
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Talk.' From an unabashedly free-market perspective, Aronson and
Cowhey examine the changing nature of the telecommunications sector,
both as a crucial input to all services and as a source of services trade in
itself. They conclude that the strategic importance of telecommunications
services (which they correctly describe as being "at the heart of the struggle for leadership in high technology" 2 ) means that national governments
will be under enormous pressure to engage in subsidies, discriminatory
purchasing and standard-setting, and other "mercantilist" practices. They
note, however, that this pressure will be matched by the need to maintain
open, flexible, and inexpensive telecommunications networks in order to
remain competitive in other vital service areas, such as banking, insurance, and data processing.' The eventual shape of the telecommunications
industry, and of the service industries that it makes possible, will be determined by the relationship between these two forces.
Though aware of many possibilities for trouble along the way, Aronson
and Cowhey are optimists. They admit that some future historian may
look back and "conclude that the telecommunications authorities of the
world won a remarkable struggle to sustain their quasi-monopolistic control over the industry in the face of a major assault by their largest customers," 4 but they find it more likely that she will "write that starting in
the 1970s the world reversed its rigidly mercantilist controls over the telecommunications industry and opened up major new markets for global
commerce even though global trade in other goods was subject to many
new limitations. ' '
I will discuss this conclusion, and the analysis supporting it, but will
first provide a brief description of the current environment with particular
attention to the contrasting approaches favored by U.S. and European
regulators. Following a discussion of technological and trade issues covered by Aronson and Cowhey, I will also look briefly at a topic they ignore: the political and social implications of the new technologies and the
regulators' responses to them.

1. J. ARONSON & P. COWHEY, WHEN COUNTRIES TALK: INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

(1988) [hereinafter

ARONSON AND OOWHEY].

2. Id. at 11.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 10.
5. Id.
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THE GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT: SOME HISTORY
AND BACKGROUND

It has not been very long (only a little over a century) since "international telecommunications" meant "mail" and even less time (about
twenty five years) since "data transmission" meant the shipping of
punched cards. The first international telecommunications conference was
the Telegraph Conference of 1865, which led to the formation of the International Telegraph Union, predecessor of today's International Telecommunication Union.6 For most of the time since then, government regulation of international telecommunications has involved the extraction of
monopoly rents that could be used to subsidize other activities. Sometimes
this was done through direct financial transfers (as in the case of West
German cross subsidization of postal service with telephone revenues);
other times it was accomplished through indirect measures, such as the
maintenance of over-staffed facilities and redundant factories in order to
maintain employment. A universal practice was the pricing of long-distance services at exorbitant levels in order to subsidize the provision of
local telephone service below cost, which had both political and practical
dividends.
Services everywhere were provided by monopolists. 7 In the United
States, this meant the private (but heavily regulated) AT&T; virtually
everywhere else, it meant entities directly controlled by the government,
generally known as Postal, Telephone and Telegraph authorities, or
PTTs. Outside of rate-setting (usually handled by separate bodies), the
same entities that engaged in the provision of services were responsible for
technical regulation, standard-setting, and so on. Not surprisingly, this
meant that a substantial number of regulations ostensibly designed solely
to protect the network from harm caused by incompatible devices actually
served to protect the telephone company from competition-as in the
Hush-A-Phone case, where it was maintained (ultimately unsuccessfully)
that the attachment of a simple plastic noise shield to a telephone mouth6. For a clear history of the International Telecommunication Union and the international communications environment, see generally G. CODDING & A. RUTKOWSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD 3-55 (1982).
7. This was not true in the early days of the U.S. telephone network, which for several decades
saw vigorous competition in the local-services arena, with most towns containing more than one local
telephone company. By the early 1920s, however, a consolidation had taken place and little competition existed. For an interesting history of the early telephone network and its highly competitive
character, see Bornholz & Evans, The Early History of Competition in the Telephone Industry, in
BREAKING UP BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION I (D. Evans ed.
1983).
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piece could result in dire consequences.'
For many decades, these restrictions probably did little harm. The technology for providing what is elegantly known in the trade as POTS (for
Plain Old Telephone Service) was such that economies of scale
predominated, making it a true natural monopoly, and the ability to provide any other services awaited the development of technology more advanced than the electromechanical systems of the day. With most economic
activity still centering around the production and consumption of goods,
and with much of the business world operating at a slow enough pace to
accommodate the mails, the harm done by overpriced long distance service
was probably counterbalanced by the benefits of using long distance revenues to subsidize local rates. Expanding the telephone network through
such subsidies to include almost everyone made it more valuable to all
who used it. Life was easy for regulators, and economists and policy analysts paid little attention to telecommunications issues.
Technology, however, is no friend to regulators' peace of mind, and the
inattention of policy analysts is a chancy thing at best. As the new technology of computers began to creep into the world of telecommunications
and vice versa, the tidy regulatory distinctions of previous years were
threatened. The traditional view of the public telephone network as having "a simple Euclidean structure, with an inside and an outside"9 began
to erode, and the telephone network began to be seen as a far more complex collection of submarkets. Simultaneously, a new enthusiasm for deregulation came into vogue (especially in the United States), and economists and policy analysts began to look at the telecommunications industry
as a likely field for analysis and experimentation. In response to both factors, the Federal Communications Commission began to chip away at the
traditional Bell System monopoly, establishing new sectors open to competition." Much more slowly, other nations began to follow suit.
8. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
9. P. Huber, The Geodesic Network: 1987 Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry
1.6 (1987) (prepared for the Department of Justice in accordance with United States v. Western
Electric, 552 F. Supp. 131, 194-95 (D.D.C. 1982)).
10. The Commission opened up domestic long distance competition in private line services which
allowed Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) to enter the private line business by establishing a
microwave link between Chicago and St. Louis. In re Applications of Microwave Communications,
Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969); In re Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971)
(decisions allowing creation of specialized systems offering long distance communications service connecting to the local telephone company network); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d
365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978) (usually referred to as the Execunet I case);
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980
(1978) (Execunet I) (allowing MCI and others to enter into competition with AT&T in sale of long
distance services directly to the public).
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The United States Experience
The U.S. experience with telecommunications liberation shows that
technological and market developments have played at least as large a role
as regulatory philosophies. Although microwave networks created consternation by casting doubt on the natural monopoly character of long-distance service, it was the computer revolution that created the most difficulty for the traditional regulatory structure. In the early 1960s the
number of computers in the United States increased sharply. 1 These
early mainframe machines stood alone, but it rapidly became apparent
that requiring users to approach the computer as if it were some Delphic
oracle, though satisfying to the technicians who maintained the machines
and controlled access, was far from the most efficient way of doing business. As a result, ways were explored of making computers more accessible, primarily through telecommunications.
These efforts created all sorts of problems with which the existing regulatory framework was ill-suited to deal. The most obvious method of communication among computers, and between computers and users, was via
the public telephone network. However, the existing switched network
was poorly suited for such purposes: the digital signals used by computers
had to be converted to analog signals that could be carried over lines
designed with the human voice in mind, then converted back to digital
signals at the other end, a process that utilized modems that were slow,
expensive, and unacceptably error-prone. 2
Modifying the telephone network to support data communications was
possible (indeed, the Bell System had considerable experience in doing just
that for its own internal purposes), but AT&T was not especially interested in doing so since it was barred from entering the computer business
In addition, the Commission removed barriers to connection of non-Bell System equipment to the
telephone network, allowing the growth of competition in the Customer Premises Equipment (CPE)
sector (CPE includes all equipment, other than specialized network interfaces, installed on the customer's property. Such equipment runs the gamut from Private Branch Exchanges, which are essentially customer-owned switches, down to individual handsets, answering machines, etc.). The chief
effect of this policy was the growth of considerable competition in the telephone handset market. See
generally Comment, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry: Beyond Telerent, 86 YALE
L.J. 538 (1977).
11. This growth has continued at an accelerated pace, of course.
12. Modems are so called because they modulate the digital signals used by computers (which
consist of simple on-off pulses) into analog signals consisting of audible tones that can be transmitted
by ordinary telephone lines designed for voice communications, then demodulate the analog signals
back into digital signals again at the other end. For the purposes of this discussion all that need be
understood is that modems are slow, expensive, and (until recently, and in most countries) subject to
rigorous control by the telecommunications provider.
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by the 1956 consent decree settling an antitrust case brought by the Department of Justice."3 Also, computer companies feared that AT&T might
manipulate computer communications standards for anticompetitive ends
if the consent decree restrictions were relaxed.
With offsetting power blocs preventing action by other sectors of the
government, the Commission attempted to deal with these problems in a
number of proceedings. These attempts shed considerable light on the difficulties involved in adjusting regulatory frameworks to meet changing
technologies and provide an interesting contrast to the approaches taken
by foreign telecommunications authorities in response to the same
problems. The Commission faced a twofold challenge: ensuring that obsolete regulations did not strangle new technologies, while also ensuring that
entrenched companies (particularly AT&T) could not fence out new
competitors.
Its first effort, the so-called Computer I proceeding, involved a threepart classification scheme based on technical characteristics: data processing, communications services, and hybrid services. Each classification was
subjected to different types and amounts of regulation." So-called data
processing services were not regulated, since the Commission found that
competition in that field was already widespread. Communications services, comprising those aspects of data transfer that appeared close to
traditional phone-company offerings, were regulated as common carrier
offerings under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, meaning that
they were subject to traditional regulation of rates, tariff structure, etc. 5
And hybrid services, defined as offerings combining "[rlemote [aiccess data
processing and message-switching to form a single integrated service""'
were treated as either unregulated data processing services or as common
carrier communications services based on a case-specific determination of
which aspect was predominant. AT&T and its operating subsidiaries
13. United States v. Western Electric, 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956). This
decision barred AT&T from entering unregulated markets and limited it to the provision of commoncarrier telecommunications services and government projects. AT&T's manufacturing activity was
limited to products for its own use and it was required to make its patents available to all comers.
These restrictions remained in effect until the 1982 consent decree that effectuated the Bell System
breakup.
14. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970); Final Decision and
Order 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971); affd sub nor. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.
1973); decision on remand, 40 F.C.C.2d 293 (1973).
15. See Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 201-224 (West Supp.
1989).
16. 40 F.C.C.2d at 295.
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were, the Commission assumed, forbidden from providing data processing
services by the terms of the 1956 consent decree, but the Commission did
formulate rules by which other regulated carriers could provide data
processing services. Those rules required structural separation, that is, the
creation of separate data processing subsidiaries so as to prevent improper
cross-subsidies, discrimination, or other anticompetitive behavior.
Although this regime seemed eminently sensible in the early 1970s, it
quickly proved to be unworkable, not least because virtually all of the
action was in the hybrid category. Computer I's case-by-case regulation
meant, among other things, that identical devices or services could be
treated in different ways depending on how they were marketed, a plainly
unacceptable result.
The Commission went back to the drawing board and emerged with the
Computer H proceeding, 1" which was a distinct improvement in many
ways. Recognizing that technical or marketing distinctions were doomed
to obsolescence in short order, the Commission adopted a more functional
approach. 8 Computer H divided services into two categories, "basic" and
"enhanced." Basic services were the offering of transmission capacity for
the movement of information by a common carrier. 9 Any technologies or
services involved in providing such transmission-for example, data
processing, computer memory, or storage-would be basic services so long
as they served that function. Considering such services to be traditional
common carrier activities, the Commission continued to subject them to
Title II common carrier regulation.
Enhanced services were defined as "any offering over the telecommunications network which is more than a basic transmission service." 20 Since
the Commission found that the enhanced service market was truly competitive, and that consumers were deriving meaningful benefits from that
competition, it concluded that regulation of enhanced services was not in
the public interest.
In order to keep AT&T from using those sectors of the market in
17. Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
18. Id. at 430.
19. Id. at 420.
20. Id. The Commission further explained what it meant by enhanced services by saying that
the functions it considered "more than a basic transmission service" consisted of:
[S]ervices, offered over common carrier transmission facilities .. .which employ computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of
the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different or restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.
47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1988).
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which it had monopoly power to gain an unfair advantage in competitive
sectors, the Commission imposed a regime known as "structural separation," which had previously been applied to other carriers under Computer I. This meant that the competitive services would be provided by a
separate subsidiary, which came to be known as AT&T Information Systems or AT&T-IS. AT&T-IS was forbidden from owning local exchange
facilities or becoming involved in other monopoly areas, while AT&T's
local operating companies were forbidden from providing enhanced
services.
This was an innovative attempt to deal with the problems posed by the
convergence of telecommunications and data processing, but it left many
problems. Some were definitional, e.g., trying to decide what was a "basic" versus an "enhanced" service turned out to be more difficult than it
might have seemed. Others involved the lost efficiencies resulting from the
forced separation between provision of basic and enhanced services. For
example, voice storage was designated an enhanced service because the
Commission believed that competitive providers could provide it efficiently. It turned out, however, that only the network operator (that is, the
telephone company) had access to sufficient economies of scope and scale
to make voice mail worthwhile, meaning that consumers were denied the
opportunity to obtain such services via the telephone network. Instead,
they turned to a near-substitute, purchasing billions of dollars worth of
telephone answering machines, virtually all imported from abroad, with
predictable effects on the U.S. telecommunications trade balance.
This is just one example of the problems with Computer H. Overall,
the result was that consumers were still missing out on the new products,
services, and lower prices, that would have been available in a freer market. The U.S. trade balance suffered as well, as capabilities not available
through the communications network were supplied instead by equipment
bought by customers, usually from foreign firms, as in the case of the
answering machines just mentioned.
The problems with Computer II might have been worked out, but
before there was any opportunity to do so matters were disrupted by a
bombshell from an unexpected quarter: the consent decree settling an antitrust suit brought against AT&T by the Department of Justice. 1 That
decree, known as the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) because it techni21. United States v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). For a thorough, if oddly titled, analysis of the MFJ and its
impact see Dempsey, Adam Smith Assaults Ma Bell With His Invisible Hands: Divestiture, Deregulation, and the Need for a New Telecommunications Policy, 11 Hastings, Comm./Ent. L.J. 527
(1989).
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cally constituted an alteration of the earlier 1956 consent decree, demolished the very underpinnings of the Computer II regime. The old integrated national telephone company controlled by AT&T and popularly
known as the Bell System was shattered. The twenty two local telephone
companies, known as Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) were separated
from AT&T and placed under the control of seven newly-created Regional Holding Companies (RHC).2 2 The newly-truncated AT&T retained the long-distance operations of the old Long Lines division and the
manufacturing operations of Western Electric and retained title to
AT&T-IS.
It was obvious that Computer II was poorly adapted to the new environment, in spite of frantic efforts by the Commission to adapt its rules.
Thus, after some floundering the Commission developed a new approach,
embodied in its Computer III proceeding.2 3 With a candor unusual among
administrative agencies, the Commission recognized that the Computer II
regime had not worked.

24

After extensive public comments, the Commission adopted a new regulatory structure that abandoned the separatist approach in favor of an integrated network subject to regulations designed to promote competition.
Structural separation was replaced with a series of nonstructural safeguards (addressing cost allocation, protection of confidential customer information, technical disclosures, and nondiscriminatory installation and
maintenance) together with both short term and long term changes in network architecture designed to address many of the problems previously
experienced. The goal was to ensure that the telephone companies could
not harm competitors by subjecting them to inferior-quality connections,
poaching on their customers or overcharging them for services that could
not be obtained elsewhere because of the monopoly character of the local
telephone network.
For the short term, those changes involve Comparably Efficient Interconnection (CEI). The CEI requirement provides that AT&T and the
BOCs, in order to be permitted to offer an enhanced service without using
a separate subsidiary, must file a CEI plan for that service. The CEI plan
ensures that CEI will be available to competing Enhanced Services Providers (ESPs) when the carrier begins offering its own enhanced service to
the public and the ESPs will receive the same service as the carrier's subsidiaries. Thus, discrimination against competitors (who must make use of
22. These companies were American Information Technologies (Ameritech), Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis (PacTel), Southwestern Bell, and U.S. West.
23. Third Computer Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986).
24. Id. at 962.
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the public telephone network and hence are vulnerable) is made much
more difficult.
CEI, however, is a transitional step. For the long term the Commission
has developed a structure known as Open Network Architecture (ONA).
ONA is designed to extend to all services, whether or not offered by
AT&T or the BOCs, the same safeguards that CEI imposes for individual
services. Once ONA is implemented, both AT&T and the BOCs will be
allowed to offer any enhanced service on an unseparated basis without the
need to file a CEI plan.
ONA is designed to open the network architecture so that it is selfenforcing in preventing discrimination. When fully implemented, ONA
will allow competitors access to the telephone network on a basis identical
to that enjoyed by the network's operators. This will facilitate a transition
to the expected "Intelligent Network" of the future,25 in which capabilities are dispersed throughout the network according to demand and in
which different parts of the network, even if controlled by different parties, function together seamlessly. For example, in an intelligent network,
a new service might be located in a centralized processor (known as a
"feature node") serving a broad area in order to concentrate demand, but
might be "migrated downward" (toward users) to individual switches as
demand picks up so as to minimize transport costs. With ONA fully implemented and supported by intelligent network architectures, this migration could be achieved even if the feature node and the switch were owned
by different parties, and indeed might occur automatically as the network
sensed changing demand patterns. The result would be an enormous gain
in flexibility and efficiency, accompanied by greatly-reduced difficulties in
25. The term "Intelligent Network" refers to the sort of computing/communications blend described here. The term "Integrated Services Digital Network," or ISDN, is used to describe the
means by which such an intelligent architecture would be implemented. The initial stage, or "basic"
ISDN would consist of a customer interface (replacing the current single voice channel) made up of
three channels: two "B" channels of voice grade (64,000 bits per second data rate) and one "D"
channel of medium speed data grade (16,000 bits per second data rate). These three channels would
all have the same address (phone number) but could be divided in a number of ways to allow voice,
data, and network signalling to be sent simultaneously, thus supporting a wide variety of services. For
example, the advanced signalling and addressing capabilities of ISDN would allow two attorneys in
different cities to conduct a LEXIS or WESTLAW search together, with the result appearing on both
of their screens, while discussing its progress over a voice connection. The exact contours of both
Intelligent Network architectures and ISDN are still subject to considerable debate both in the United
States and abroad. As is discussed infra, the nature of these contours has important strategic as well
as technical ramifications, which is one of the main reasons for the debate. For a good survey of
Intelligent Network thinking and of current plans for implementation, see TELECOMMUNICATIONS
MANAGEMENT PLANNING: ISDN NETWORKS, PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (R. Heldman ed. 1987).
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introducing new services.20
The above discussion traces the way in which telecommunications liberalization has progressed in the United States, and provides some sense of
how that liberalization has been as much the result of technological and
market imperatives as of regulatory philosophy. Despite all of its difficulties (particularly those stemming from the AT&T divestiture) the effort
has largely been a success and has contributed to making the U.S. telecommunications sector one of the strongest and most vibrant in the world.
The Experience in Other Countries
The U.S. experience has begun to inspire other nations to emulate the
U.S. approach, although to lesser degrees and in ways that reflect those
nations' own unique histories and philosophies. For example, the prime
goal of the British Telecommunications Act of 1984 was to "transfer the
provision of telecommunications services to the private sector and subject it
to forces of competition." 7 Under the Act, British Telecom's monopoly
status was eliminated2" and the initial steps were taken toward that company's privatization. 9 In addition, a competing public network, Mercury,
was established, and numerous private networks were permitted, while
many forms of resale and shared use that had previously been prohibited
were now permitted.
Japan, too, has begun to liberalize its approach. It recently took action
to separate its local carriers from long distance, much as was done in the
AT&T divestiture. In addition, the opportunities for non-facilities-based
competition by both Japanese and foreign companies have been expanded
considerably, although "Type I" carriers (those which own their own facilities rather than leasing them from others) are still required to be Japanese-owned. Though many barriers still remain, the Japanese services
market is far more open than it was only a few years ago, and far more
open than the markets of most other countries.80
The European Community is also beginning to take steps to modernize
its approach. In 1987, the European Commission released a "Green Paper" on telecommunications, recommending that the European PTTs
drop their parochial methods and attempt to develop a truly European
market in telecommunications goods and services so as to become competi26. Id.
27. R. HAMILTON,

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

ACT OF 1984: A PRACTITIONER'S COMPAN-

ION 7 (1984).

28. Telecommunications Act 1984 § 2.
29. Id. at §§ 60-73.
30. ARONSON AND COWHEY, supra note 1, at 135-141.
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tive with U.S. and Japanese companies."1 The Commission recommended
that the monopoly power of the PTTs be sharply limited, and that monopoly functions be separated from competitive functions in order to prevent discrimination and cross-subsidy that could impede competition.
Although there was considerable hostility to some of its recommendations from the PTTs, some parts of the Green Paper are already going
into effect. A key recommendation of the Green Paper was the separation
of regulatory functions from operational functions-without such a separation, the situation would resemble a baseball game in which the umpire
both pitched and called strikes. This policy has been implemented in several European countries, and is under consideration elsewhere.
THE FUTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALIZATION

Having come this far, we are finally ready to discuss the central question of Aronson and Cowhey's book: is the current progress in opening
telecommunications markets just the beginning, or will entrenched and
still-powerful monopolistic forces succeed in stemming the tide? Aronson
and Cowhey suggest ways in which those forces might try, and predict the
likely outcomes. The following illustration explains why frustrating
change for any substantial period will be difficult.
The most likely shape for efforts at repulsing competition will be that
of PTT use of their standard-setting power to configure networks in ways
that make competition difficult or impossible. Aronson and Cowhey describe the ways in which this might be done in some detail.8 2 As they note,
the European PTTs
[alre still a long way from renouncing the old system of national
monopoly linked to an international cartel for services-a classic
set of national mercantilistic policies. The PTTs adapted slowly
and awkwardly to the merger of computers and communications.
Most European PTTs continued to cling to their traditional postal, telephone, and telex monopolies. Some even hoped to expand
the scope of their monopolies by extending the notion of technological "national champions" to the data communications
network."
31. See id. at 182; Commission of the European Communities, Toward a Dynamic European
Economy: Green Paper on the Development of a Common Market for Telecommunications Services
and Equipment (June 30, 1987).
32. ARONSON AND COWHEY, supra note 1, at 177-213.

33. Id. at 178.
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In pursuing these goals, the PTTs rely on their control of many aspects
of the network and on use restrictions based more on PTT strategies than
on user needs. For example, Aronson and Cowhey point out that the more
aggressive PTTs have tended to:
" require local processing of some information, thus obstructing
user efforts to achieve economies through the use of remote data
processing networks;
" oppose the use of private leased lines (which are charged at a
flat rate) in the hopes of forcing users onto the public switched
network where they are charged on a volume-sensitive basis;
" forbid resale and shared use of leased lines, so that small communications users cannot combine to achieve economies by leaving the public switched network;
" prohibit the connection of private leased lines to the public
switched network, making it impossible for competition to develop for switched long-distance services without the installation
of costly parallel networks;
" ban the development of independent, non-PTT transmission facilities, making the development of such networks impossible;
• require that the "first telephone" on a line, or the modem on a
data line, be purchased only from the PTT;
" make independent testing and "type certification" of customer
premises equipment very difficult - ostensibly to "protect the
network from technical harm" but with the actual effect of protecting PTT equipment sales from competition;
" forbid private parties from providing enhanced services to the
public over leased lines;
" refuse to grant operating agreements to more than one international long distance carrier;
* discriminate in purchasing network equipment in favor of local
suppliers regardless of whether they are competitive in terms of
cost or quality. 4
As should be obvious by comparison with the U.S. policies described
earlier, the effect of these practices has been to restrict sharply the amount
of competition available and to entrench the PTT monopolies. However,
concerted pressure from the United States, Great Britain, and large users
has begun to take its toll on these restrictions. The so-called Witte Commission report of 1987, for example, called for some liberalization of the
34. Id. at 178-80.
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West German network, with abandonment of the "first telephone" requirement, competition in voice mail services, and possible abolition (in a
few years) of the leased line monopoly involved. It is unclear, however,
whether these recommendations will enter into effect. 5
Similarly, the European Commission's Green Paper provides for some
expansion of competition in Europe although it is far less ambitious than
processes of liberalization underway in the United States, Great Britain,
or (even) Japan. There are ten key positions within the Green paper,
concisely summarized by Aronson and Cowhey as follows:
1. PTTs continue to control and operate the network infrastructure but competitive, two-way satellite systems are allowed on a
case-by-case basis;
2. No new competition in the provision of voice telephone service;
3. All other services provided on an unrestricted basis within and
between Member States (for own use, shared use, or provision to
third parties);
4. Strict standards for networ'k infrastructure and services for all
service providers including PTTs;
5. By Community Directive, all requirements imposed by PTTs
on providers of competitive services for use of the network to be
clearly defined;
6. Unrestricted provision of terminal equipment including Receive
Only [satellite] Earth Stations (Provision of the first telephone set
could be excluded);
7. Separation of regulatory and operational activities of PTTs;
8. Strict continuous review of commercial activities of PTTs, parand
of services
cross-subsidization
ticularly regarding
manufacturing;
9. Strict continuous review of all private providers in newly
opened sectors to avoid the abuse of dominant positions;
10. Full application of the Community's common commercial policy to telecommunications. Information to be provided to build up
a consistent Community position for GATT negotiations and relations with Third Countries. 6
The Green Paper thus trades off some significant liberalizations (e.g., unrestricted provision of non-voice services and separation of regulatory and
operational activities by PTTs) for retention of substantial PTT control.
35. Id. at 180-82.
36. Id. at 183.

[Vol. 21

REVIEW ESSAY

The PTTs, for example, retain their voice monopoly (which accounts for
about eighty-five percent of their revenues) and retain the prerogative of
limiting outside access to leased lines and preventing resale of voice services.8 7 Still, Aronson and Cowhey conclude (correctly, I believe) that the
PTTs are losing the battle to retain uncontested control of their networks."8 That battle is not the war, however.
The next stage of the struggle involves the introduction of intelligent
network technology, discussed earlier in the context of the U.S. Open Network Architecture concept. The PTTs, however, favor a network architecture that would be far less open. Although the issues involved are often
disguised as purely technical matters, the consequences for the market and
for international trade in both services and equipment are substantial.
As was discussed earlier, the U.S. prohibition against telephone company provision of voice storage services (better known as "voice mail") led
to a flood of foreign-made answering machines entering the U.S. market.
This example was merely a specific and highly-visible case of a more general phenomenon: most information services can be provided in any one of
three ways-via the telephone network, via customer-owned equipment,
or via third-party providers accessed through the telephone network or
other telecommunications means. Generally speaking, the nature of the
service will dictate which approach is economically most appealing. For
example, voice mail is most efficiently provided via the telephone network
because of rather obvious economies of scope and scale. Specialized services like LEXIS or WESTLAW are more efficiently provided via third
parties accessed remotely, since there is no reason to think that, e.g., Bell
Atlantic or AT&T has either the expertise or the inclination to put together and market a legal database. And general computing services are
usually most efficiently provided at the customer's premises, which is why
this review was written on a personal computer and not on a terminal
connected to a colossal mainframe computer located in some other state.
37. Id. at 183-84.
38. Id. at 184. The United States, for example, has targeted the European Community for priority action under the telecommunications provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness of
1988 Act, H.R. 4848, 100th Cong. 2d. Sess., P.L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. That Act sets out a
number of negotiating objectives that must be met within a fairly short time (one year, with the
possibility of two one-year extensions by act of Congress); among those objectives are open access to
leased lines, type certification, and nondiscriminatory tariffing and procurement. Id. § 1375. Not only
will the rather stiff sanctions provided for under the Act provide a powerful impetus themselves, but
they will also provide a useful bogeyman to strengthen the hands of European players anxious to
promote liberalization themselves. For a discussion of earlier U.S. efforts to open foreign markets, see
Howell, Benz & Wolff, InternationalCompetition in the Information Technologies:Foreign Government Intervention and the U.S. Response, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 215, 228-240 (1986).
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In an ideally efficient network, these economic considerations would determine the way in which such services are provided. Those wishing to
utilize another method of delivery would be free to try, but would likely
pay the marketplace price for bucking economic realities. Telecommunications markets, however, are regulated and regulators do not always proceed in such a fashion. Sometimes this is because the regulators do not
understand the situation; other times it is because regulators understand
the situation all too well but have goals other than efficiency in mind.
Furthermore, those engaged in the design of networks have far more
latitude than those simply engaged in the operation and regulation of networks already in existence. In many cases it is even possible to manipulate
the economic efficiencies involved in order to favor or disfavor certain
types of technologies. A network may be structured so as to make it easy
for peripheral equipment and outside companies to offer services in competition with the network provider (as in the case of the Commission's
Open Network Architecture), or it may be structured in order to place
such competitors at a disadvantage. Aronson and Cowhey examine the
likelihood that the European PTTs might combine behind a unified European network architecture that would in fact serve as a disguised industrial policy.
As the authors note, Europeans are concerned (with some basis) that
they are "falling dangerously behind" in computer technology, and are
particularly unhappy with the dominant role played by IBM in the European market. They consider Europe to be better positioned in telecommunications, but that position is made vulnerable by the problems of the
computer industry given the convergence of the two technologies.
This being the case, Europeans are likely to be tempted to structure
their implementation of advanced networks (known as Integrated Services
Digital Networks or ISDNs) 39 in a way that will help shore up their

deficiencies and protect their strengths. Aronson and Cowhey describe
how this might be done. As they say,
[an ISDN becomes mercantilist when its terms for entry, pricing,
and systems architecture are designed to make sure that the PTT
will be the dominant (not necessarily the sole) source and designer
of value-added services. The PTT could discourage all independent provision of telecommunications facilities. .

.

. Special com-

munication services, such as data bases or videotext, would be car39. See J.

BELLAMY, DIGITAL TELEPHONY 404-412

NICATIONS MANAGEMENT PLANNING:

ISDN

(1982) (describing ISDNs);

NETWORKS, PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

TELECOMMU-

(R. Heldman

ed. 1987); see also supra note 25 (describing ISDNs).
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Tied (or supplied) by the PTT and be listed on a single public
directory. By making the system as smart as possible, and by excluding alternative approaches to combining communications and
data, the system pushes the PTT (and the communications system) to standardize much of the information industry. In short,
the PTT would try to use its control over a vital part of the combined information and communications industries to set technical
standards that would give it competitive leverage over the information industry.'
Manipulating ISDN in order to secure competitive advantage would
take place through the relationship between a digital network and an international communications standard developed by the International Standards Organization. The standard is known as Open Systems Interconnection (OSI). Its purpose is to allow different systems to communicate
with one another, so that any end user connected to an OSI-compatible
system can interconnect with any other. OSI consists of seven layers or
levels. The most basic levels deal with intra-network communications and
have little to do with users; intermediate levels mediate between the network and users; and the highest levels define the way that the user's hardware will translate the communicated data into the project underway."
Layers one through three are well established, layer four is under discussion, but the higher levels are not yet defined."'
The key question is who controls the definition of the higher levels. The
more the PTT is able to control the higher levels of OSI as part of its
implementation, the more it will be able to control markets for customer
owned computer and communications equipment. This control can be
used to shape demand in ways that favor national or European producers
at the expense of foreign companies. For example, if the upper layers of
OSI are controlled by the PTTs and if their ISDN implementation is
40. ARONSON AND COWHEY, supra note 1, at 190. The use of standards as a tool for competitive advantage is not limited to the telecommunications field, of course. Wrangling over standards, and
attempts to manipulate them for competitive advantage, have characterized a number of high-technology fields, with the best-known example being the ongoing struggle over high-definition television
(HDTV). See, e.g., S. BESEN & L. JOHNSON, COMPATIBILITY STANDARDS, COMPETITION, AND
INNOVATION IN THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY

121-25 (RAND CORPORATION No. R-3453-NSF,

Nov. 1986).
41. ARONSON AND COWHEY, Supra note 1, at 190-91.

42. Id. The levels are: (1) Physical; (2) Data Link; (3) Network; (4) Transport; (5) Session; (6)
Presentation; and (7) Application. H. Gates, Computer Networking and Data Communications, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY TEXT 380-86 (L. Lewin ed. 1984) (providing an

excellent description of OSI).
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designed to be incompatible with, e.g., IBM's own interconnection standard known as Systems Network Architecture (SNA), two things happen.
First, customers are encouraged to purchase equipment designed to be
more compatible-perhaps supplied by the PTT itself, or at least by a
non-IBM producer native to Europe. Second, customers will be encouraged to purchase services over the network that are substituted for
those provided by incompatible IBM equipment. Such services might be
purchased from the PTT; they would at least be purchased through the
PTT's network.4 The difference in trade impact of such a regime as compared with the U.S. Open Network Architecture system should be
obvious.
Aronson and Cowhey conclude, however, that such an approach,
though obviously appealing to European regulators and monopolists, is
unlikely to work. They give several reasons for this conclusion. First,
standard-setting is a notoriously difficult business. Large players with
substantial market shares and customer loyalties can sabotage standards
simply by refusing to go along. IBM might well be able to accomplish this
on its own-it has already made clear that higher levels of OSI will access
its own system, SNA, through "gateways" that will serve as translators
while leaving SNA itself untouched. This would probably keep OSI out of
SNA's internal architecture entirely. IBM is counterattacking by developing systems that will make non-SNA systems more amenable to interaction with IBM products.""
In addition, large users with substantial, embedded bases of equipment
are likely to resist ISDN implementations that would limit their purchasing options. "Moreover," as Aronson and Cowhey note, "to assure reliability and security, many large users insist on providing or duplicating
functions at some OSI layers in their own system. They are not interested
in an ISDN design that makes them pay twice." 4' 5 Thus, efforts to manip43. IBM is not above engaging in similar tactics to defend its own position in various markets.
For example, it has been accused of embarking on a long-term effort to move users back to computer
networks dominated by IBM equipment and away from stand-alone PCs which can more easily be
"cloned" at IBM expense. See Dvorak, Watch Out for Big Blue's Big Bang, PC MAGAZINE, Mar.
28, 1989, at 73 ("[Tlhe main goal of IBM through 1996 is to stem the trend toward standalone
computing." IBM's strategy "is to create a fancy environment of clustered coprocessing workstations
working off a host. The heck with one computer/one person. ... Long term, IBM's role as a leader
in the industry, if it is to continue, will be oriented toward de-emphasizing the powerful single-user
system. The fact is, the powerful single-user system is getting too powerful too fast!").
44. ARONSON AND COWHEY, supra note 1, at 193-96. For a description of SNA and its relationship to OSI see Gates, supra note 42, at 371-92. See also Korzeniowski, IBM to Reach Beyond
SNA, COMMUNICATIONS WEEK, February 25, 1989, at 1 (describing IBM efforts to enable SNA
penetration of other systems, including OSI).
45. ARONSON AND COW-EY, supra note 1, at 196-97.
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ulate standards run the risk of duplicating the Commission's voice mail
blunder: unable to get what they want through the public network, consumers will simply move to the next best alternative rather than docilely
taking whatever the regulators want to dish out.
Finally, as one moves higher up the OSI ladder, the difficulties in securing cooperation grow greater and the benefits of doing so shrink. The
higher levels are most implicated in new (and in many cases as yet poorlydefined) services. The nature of those services is constantly changing, new
entrants are constantly appearing, and the technology behind the new services is evolving far more rapidly than is the underlying network technology. Thus, any efforts by PTTs to penetrate the upper levels of OSI are
likely to run into much more difficult political and technical barriers."6
Aronson and Cowhey do not, however, mention the greatest barrier of
all to a standards-manipulating approach: the fact that the regulators who
implement it will probably not know what they are doing. Although the
previous description of how standards might be manipulated illustrates the
way in which successful manipulation of standards might substantially
benefit national industries at the expense of foreign competitors, obtaining
such success will depend on near-perfect knowledge not only of existing
technology, but of technology likely to appear in coming years and of the
economics of both. Given the rather dismal record of regulators (and just
about everyone else) in anticipating and understanding technological
change, it seems unlikely that a group of comfortable bureaucrats whose
training and life experience stem from a monopoly industry will be up to
the task.
Nonetheless, they are likely to try, and telecommunications competitors
and customers would do well to be alert for such efforts. Simply because
the regulators are doomed to fail in the long run does not mean that their
actions will not be troublesome and costly for all concerned in the shorter
run. Aronson and Cowhey's analysis, by making it easier for readers of
both the policy and industry sectors to recognize and understand such efforts for what they are, is likely to prove very helpful in forestalling at
least the most egregious gambits.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALIZATION AND ITS EFFECT ON SOCIETY

Over the long run there will be a growing realization that in an economy dominated by services an open, flexible, and reasonably priced telecommunications network is essential for competitiveness. In the early days
of railroads, various localities attempted to promote their own interests by
46. Id. at 196-98.

1989]

LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

creating "gaps" in the railways that would result in boosted revenues for
local hotels, drayage concerns, and so on. The folly of such efforts was
satirized by one nineteenth century writer who facetiously proposed a
"'negative railway" consisting of nothing but gaps so as to enrich every
town along its course."' Soon enough, railway gaps were recognized as
simply a way for one sector of the economy to extract money from others
while producing a net loss for the economy as a whole.
Given some time, people will recognize that obstructive and inefficient
telecommunications regulations fall into the same category and that the
maintenance of first-class telecommunications networks (free from burdensome mercantilist restrictions) is as crucial to national competitiveness
in the services arena as the maintenance of first-class seaports, railroads
and highways is to competitiveness in the sale of goods.48 One flaw in
Aronson and Cowhey's book is that they do not make this point forcefully
enough; although it is implicit in their analysis and conclusion, they
would have done their readers, and everyone else, a favor had they stated
it more clearly up front.
Such a realization will have substantial political implications as well,
though that too is an aspect of the issue that Aronson and Cowhey ignore.
Information, more than most goods, is of considerable political importance, and governments since time immemorial have sought to control the
flow of information (both among their citizens and between their countries
and foreign lands) for political purposes. Until recently the exercise of
such control was, in an economic sense, largely free. There were exceptions: for example, the initial English practice of licensing and closely controlling printers caused an enormous amount of that nation's publishing
business to flow overseas, particularly to the Netherlands where printers
labored under much lighter restrictions.4 9 The value of printing to the
seventeenth and eighteenth century British economy, however, was minor;
information industries today are of considerably greater importance.
Already this effect is beginning to be felt in small ways. Even in the
Soviet Union, where copy machines are supervised by the KGB and
47. The satirist was French economist Frederic Bastiat. See R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY
179-180 (6th ed. 1986) (describing Bastiat's "negative railway" proposal).
48. See, e.g., G. REYNOLDS AND R. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY
225-26 (1989) (noting, in context of dispute over private international satellite communications services, that "the importance of information industries to the overall economy of a nation far exceeds
their value in terms of the jobs and national income that they create directly on their own ....
Thus,
obstructionist telecommunications regulation intended to keep out foreign competition will [ultimatelyl
be seen as the equivalent of destroying roads and harbors in order to reduce imports of foreign television sets-effective in a narrow sense, perhaps, but suicidal from a broader perspective.").
49. I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 15 (1983).
PHILOSOPHERS
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where even typewriters are licensed, we are beginning to see stirrings of
reform.5" Similarly, Chinese students in the United States and elsewhere
outside of the People's Republic of China made use of facsimile machines,
computer bulletin boards, and China's modern, automatic telephone system to send in uncensored news of the Beijing massacre in Tiananmen
Square.5" And in Panama, when the military government began censoring
the news and barring the importation of foreign newspapers, news stories
about the regime and its problems were sent via facsimile from foreign
countries and photocopied for distribution.5" Such happenings are odd
enough to be newsworthy now, but they will soon become commonplace.
As information-processing tools like computers, facsimile machines, laser
printers, and electronic bulletin boards become more and more widespread, and more and more essential to the conducting of business, the
ability of governments to limit their spread and use without bearing fearsome economic costs will be much less. Still more dramatic in its impact
will be the spread (already imminent) of compact and inexpensive satellite
up- and downlink equipment, which will make events in even the most
remote regions fodder for worldwide television regardless of the efforts of
governments to ensure otherwise.
I think that this is a good thing. While the spread of communications
technologies and the accompanying growth in the ability of people to communicate despite the disapproval of their governments will not in themselves prevent tyranny and abuses of human rights, they will make both
more difficult. And it is worth noting that writer Arthur C. Clarke whose
reputation for accurate predictions is worthy of considerable respect,5 3 sees
the spread of communications technologies as the single thing most likely
to prevent a nuclear war. 4 Regulatory policies that will promote this
trend are good; those that retard it are not. Keeping this in mind provides
a helpful standard for evaluating government actions. Although matters
50. See Rogers and Bogert, Red Hackers, Arise!, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1989, at 58.
51. The Chinese government responded, inter alia, by posting armed guards at facsimile machines, an approach with obvious long-term problems. Aside from its inherent absurdity, this response

allows a Chinese student in Iowa City equipped with a list of facsimile numbers to tie down dozens of
security police by merely making phone calls. That is no way to suppress a revolution-particularly
as it exposes security police, whose loyalty must be unquestionable, to graphic evidence of government
lies and misconduct. See China's Fax Invasion, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1989, at A22, col. 1.
52. See PanamaniansUse Technology to Balk Censor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, at 13, col. 1
(quoting one activist as saying, "The telefax and computers, they are death to dictators, because what
can they do to stop transmission?"). From a long-term perspective, this may be true.

53. Clarke is, among other things, the inventor of the geosynchronous communications satellite,
and he correctly forecast the impact of photographs of the earth on environmental consciousness as
early as 1959.

54. A.
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may vary with specifics, generally network architectures and regulatory
structures that move computing and communicating power closer to individual users and farther from centralized control are to be promoted; those
which move in the other direction are to be opposed. Fortunately, technological trends are on the side of the good guys and are likely to stay that
way for some time.
CONCLUSION

If there is a major flaw in When Countries Talk, it is that the book
does not make this connection between political and economic freedom.
The communications field has been fortunate to attract a great deal of
interest from a number of very smart people over the last decade or so;
that interest, however, has largely appeared in two distinct areas, those of
economic policy and individual liberties. What has been lacking is much
scholarly interest in the way those areas overlap-and in the way that
systems amenable to open communications among individuals also seem
inevitably to make good economic sense. Since this flaw is one shared by
virtually everyone in the field it is unfair to pillory Aronson and Cowhey
for it, but the high quality of their economic analysis does lead one to
wish that it were coupled with explicit arguments explaining the link,
which they recognize implicitly, between individual freedom and economic
growth.
Oh well. Making explicit things that are implicit is part of the reviewer's task, and I hope that I have served well enough. When Countries
Talk is, within its self-imposed limits, an excellent piece of work, and it is
certain to be useful to policymakers, businesspeople, and others who seek
to understand the complex and rapidly changing field of international
telecommunications services. And if its readers absorb (wittingly or unwittingly) its implicit message along with its text, so much the better.
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